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Introduction 
In the response brief, UDOT does not dispute the existence of the 
compatible use doctrine or that its contours are as described in the opening brief. 
Instead, UDOT raises two alternative arguments, both of which fail. UDOTs 
first argument—private parties may not condemn land for public use—is 
contrary to a century of case law, conflicts with language in the eminent domain 
statutes, and was rejected by the district court in a ruling the Utah Court of 
Appeals declined to review. UDOTs second argument—UDOTs use of the land 
is the more necessary use—is irrelevant under the compatible use doctrine 
because courts need only weigh the relative necessity of incompatible public 
uses. If the uses are compatible, the public may benefit from both uses. 
In the district court, UDOT argued that compatible use doctrine was too 
narrow to require accommodation of two different types of uses. But on appeal 
UDOT agrees that the compatible use doctrine is well-established under Utah 
law and "presupposes that two different public uses can jointly occupy a parcel 
of land/' (Resp. Br. at 12.) Because different types of uses can be compatible, the 
issue becomes whether UDOTs detention basin is compatible with Schroeder's 
widening of his easement to construct a public road, where Schroeder will 
donate land and pay any associated costs necessary to permit UDOT to adjust its 
plans for the basin. UDOT conceded in the district court that both uses could be 
accommodated at no additional cost and with little delay. (RT.687:30.) 
1 
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("Schroeder is willing to augment the use by adding some additional property, 
and so that won't cost, it won't delay, we can accomplish this.") Those 
concessions demonstrate that the two public uses are compatible. 
In the response brief, UDOT understandably attempts to re-characterize its 
concessions. UDOT claims it is "unknown whether the detention basin could be 
built, in part, on a different site" and uncertain whether federal permits could be 
obtained to accommodate both parties' plans. (Resp. Br. at 14.) UDOT's re-
characterization of its concessions, at best, reveals disputed issues of material fact 
concerning whether the uses are compatible, something that precludes summary 
judgment. In the response brief, UDOT concedes that the district court should 
have granted its summary judgment motion only if "there are no genuine issues 
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."1 
(Resp. Br. at 2.) This court should reverse. 
1
 While the district court entered findings of fact, the standard of review is 
correctness because the issue is whether the court applied the correct legal 
standard under compatible use doctrine. (AOB at 2-3.) UDOT agrees that this 
court reviews the district court's order for correctness. (Resp. Br. at 2.) UDOT has 
not argued that the district court's findings indicate that the proceedings were 
transformed into a bench trial. Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 
UT 94, I f 9-10,54 P.3d 1177. Nor could it. No live witnesses testified at the 
hearing and no witnesses were cross-examined, leaving the evidence proffers 
more akin to a statement of facts in summary judgment papers than a bench trial. 
(R. 687.) For that reason, the court had no opportunity to, and did not, make 
credibility determinations. (R. 630-35). Regardless, the findings merely reiterate 
Schroeder's position that UDOT would have to alter its planned detention pond 
for the two public uses to be compatible. The issue in this appeal is the legal 
issue of whether compatible use doctrine can require alteration of an existing 
use, not the factual issue of whether UDOT's use had to be altered. 
o 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Statement of Facts 
Because UDOTs response brief raises new arguments as alternative 
grounds to affirm, Schroeder will provide some additional facts to place the new 
arguments in the appropriate context. 
On November 30,2009, Schroeder filed a complaint against the Edwards 
containing a condemnation claim directed at the Edwards' parcel. (R.l-8.) On 
September 24, 2010, after UDOT purchased part of that parcel—thereby dividing 
the original parcel into three parcels—Schroeder filed an amended complaint 
naming UDOT as a defendant and directing a condemnation claim at UDOTs 
newly created parcel. (R.151-59.) The Edwards filed a motion to dismiss on the 
ground that Schroeder could not condemn land for public use because it is not a 
governmental entity. (R.355,400.) UDOT joined the motion. (Id.) 
After briefing and argument, the district court denied the motions on the 
ground that "a private party may institute condemnation proceedings so long as 
it is pursuing a public use and meets applicable statutory requirements [and that 
Schroeder] has properly alleged a public use and has otherwise met the statutory 
requirements to institute a condemnation proceeding/' (R.400.) 
The Edwards filed a motion to reconsider and, after it was denied, filed a 
petition for review of the interlocutory orders rejecting the argument that 
Schroeder could not prosecute his condemnation claims as a private entity. 
(R.646-60.) The Utah Court of Appeals denied the petition. (R.682.) 
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Argument 
I. Under Utah's Eminent Domain Statutes, Schroeder May Condemn Land 
to Widen Its Easement to Build a Public Road 
In the response brief, UDOT asks this court to avoid defining the scope of 
compatible use doctrine and instead to affirm on the alternative ground that 
under Utah's eminent domain statutes private parties possess no authority to 
condemn land for public use. This court may, and should, decline to reach the 
alternative ground because, as demonstrated below, UDOT provides an 
incomplete analysis of the alternative ground in its response brief. Francis v. 
State, 2010 UT 62, If 21, 248 P.3d 44 (declining the State's invitation to affirm on 
alternative grounds). 
If this court choses to reach the merits of the alternative ground, it should 
reject UDOTs position. As demonstrated below, it is well established under 
Utah law that the authority to condemn land stems from the nature of the use, 
not the identity of the condemnor. Utah Code § 78B-6-504 (listing conditions 
precedent to a taking). That legal authority includes the unambiguous language 
of the eminent domain statutes as well as case law spanning more than a century 
recognizing that, in certain circumstances, private parties may condemn land for 
public use. Because those circumstances are present here, if this court addresses 
UDOTs alternative ground to affirm, it should reject it. 
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A. Schroeder Has a Statutory Right to Condemn 
UDOT argues that this court should hold that Schroeder may not employ 
the eminent domain statutes because there "is no express delegation to private 
entities of the power to condemn land to be used as public roads or byroads/7 
(Resp. Br. at 9.) UDOTs argument rests upon that fact that section 78B-6-501 — 
which specifies the public uses on behalf of which "the right of eminent domain 
may be exercised"—is written in the passive voice and does not address "what 
uses of eminent domain are available to private entities and which are only 
available to government." (Id. at 10.) According to UDOT, that lack of 
specificity means that private entities may not condemn. But UDOTs argument 
fails because, as discussed below, Utah's eminent domain statutes elsewhere 
expressly contemplate that private parties may condemn land for public uses. 
When interpreting statutes, this court determines a statute's meaning by 
first looking to the statute's plain language. State v. Schofield, 2002 UT132, | 8, 
63 P.3d 667. A statute's plain language "is to be read as a whole, and its 
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and 
with other statutes under the same and related chapters." IdL Utah's eminent 
domain statutes first set forth the four "[conditions precedent" to a taking, none 
of which concern the identity of the condemnor: 
(a) the use to which it is to be applied is a use 
authorized by law; 
(b) the taking is necessary for the use; 
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(c) construction and use of all property sought to be 
condemned will commence within a reasonable time 
. . . [and] 
(d) if already appropriated to some public use, the 
public use to which it is to be applied is a more 
necessary public use.2 
Utah Code § 78B-6-504. Section 78B-6-507 then expressly defines "plaintiff" for 
purposes of eminent domain, not exclusively as a governmental entity, but as a 
"corporation, association, commission, or person." IdL § 78B-6-507. Another 
section governing the voluntary dismissal of condemnation actions states that the 
"Condemner, whether a public or private body," may at any time prior to final 
payment of compensation, decide to abandon the condemnation action so long as 
reimbursement for any damages suffered is provided to the other party. Id. § 
78B-6-517 (emphasis added). Elsewhere, "[a] person other than a political 
subdivision of the state, that seeks to acquire property by eminent domain" shall 
"before filing an eminent domain action, make a reasonable effort to negotiate 
with the property owner for the purchase of the property." Id. § 78B-6~505(2) 
(emphasis added). 
Those statutes expressly contemplate that private bodies have the right of 
eminent domain even though section 78B-6-501 does not address this issue. In 
light of the references to private parties in the eminent domain statutes, section 
2
 The district court concluded that Schroeder satisfied subsections (a), (b), and (c), 
but not subsection (d) because the compatible use doctrine did not apply and 
UDOTs use was more necessary. On appeal, UDOT does not contend that 
subsection (b) and (c) are not satisfied, and thus Schroeder limits its reply to the 
requirements contained in subsections (a) and (d). 
a 
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78B-6-501 must be read to authorize private entities to exercise the right of 
eminent domain despite the lack of any reference to private entities in section 
78B-6-501. Otherwise, the references to private parties elsewhere in the eminent 
domain statute have no purpose and make no sense. Hall v. Utah State Dep't of 
Corr., 2001 UT 34, ^ 15,24 P.3d 958 (noting that when interpreting statutes this 
court seeks "to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful, and . . . 
accordingly avoid [s] interpretations that will render portions of a statute 
superfluous or inoperative/7) To give meaning to all of the language in the 
eminent domain statutes, this court should interpret them as providing private 
entities the right to exercise eminent domain under certain circumstances. 
B. Case Law Confirms Schroeder's Right to Condemn 
Confirming that section 78B-6-501 need not expressly identify that private 
entities have the right to eminent domain, Utah case law is replete with instances 
where private corporations,3 landowners,4 and citizens5 have appropriately 
brought condemnation actions. Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, | 
27, 84 P.3d 1134 (noting that Utah law gives water users the right of eminent 
3
 Doelle v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel, 872 F.2d 942,945 (10th Or. 1989) ("Under 
[Utah's eminent domain statutes] a corporation may seek condemnation by filing 
a complaint in a court of law/7). 
4Nash v. Clark, 75 P. 371,374-75 (Utah 1904) (private landowner entitled to 
condemn right of way in neighboring landowner's ditch) (affd Clark v. Nash, 
198 U.S. 361 (1905)). 
5 Watkins v. Simonds, 354 P.2d 852,855 (Utah 1960) (citing Utah Code § 78-34-
1(5)) ("[t]he right of private citizens, in a proper case, to condemn an irrigation 
easement is recognized by statute"). 
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domain to share in the use of existing ditches and canals); Williams v. Hyrum 
Gibbons & Sons Co., 602 P.2d 684, 685, 688 (Utah 1979) (private instillation 
company instituting condemnation proceedings to construct a receiver station); 
Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 392 P.2d 620, 620 (Utah 1964) 
(private corporation brought action to condemn lands for construction of a 
reservoir); Watkins, 354 P.2d at 855 (citing Utah Code § 78-34-1(5)) ("[t]he right of 
private citizens, in a proper case, to condemn an irrigation easement is 
recognized by statute."); Tacobsoen v. Memmott, 354 P.2d 569,570 (Utah 1960) 
(individual and mining company); Or. Short Line R.R. Co. v. Denver & Rio 
Grande W.R.R. Co., 120 Utah 621,237 P.2d 829,830-31 (1951) (railroad company 
could condemn leased land); Utah Copper Co. v. Stephen Hayes Estate, Inc., 83 
Utah 545,31 P.2d 624, 625 (1934) (mining company); Wasatch Gas Co. v. 
Bouwhuis, 82 Utah 573,26 P.2d 548,549 (1933) (gas company exercised eminent 
domain to obtain easement); Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consol. 
Mining Co., 255 P. 672, 672-73 (Utah 1926) (mining company); Salt Lake & Utah 
R.R. Co. v. Schramm, 56 Utah 53,189 P. 90, 91 (1920) (railroad company); 
Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consol. Mines Co., 174 P. 172,173, 
177-78 (Utah 1918) (mining company could institute condemnation proceedings 
for an easement to use a mining tunnel); Bingham & Garfield Ry. Co. v. N. Utah 
Mining Co., 162 P. 65, 66 (Utah 1916) (railroad company); Utah Lake Irrigation 
Co. v. lensen, 161 P. 677, 677 (Utah 1916) (irrigation company); Ketchum Coal Co. 
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v. Christensen, 159 P. 541,541-42 (Utah 1916) (mining company); Telluride 
Power Co. v. Bruneau, 125 P. 399,400 (Utah 1912) (power company); Tanner v. 
Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 121 P. 584,585,589 (Utah 1911) (irrigation 
company); Or. Short Line R.R. Co. v. Tones, 80 P. 732, 732 (Utah 1905) (railroad 
company); Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 215, 78 P. 296, 
298-99 (1904) (mining company condemned land for road); Or. Short Line R.R. 
Co. v. Russell 27 Utah 457, 76 P. 345,346 (1904) (railroad company); Nash v. 
Clark, 75 P. at 374-75 (private citizen condemned right of way); Postal Tel. Cable 
Co. of Utah v. Or. Short-Line R.R. Co., 23 Utah 474,65 P. 735, 736 (1901) 
(telegraph company); Rio Grande W. Ry. Co. v. Telluride Power Transmission 
Co., 23 Utah 22, 63 P. 995 (1900) (railroad company), appeal dismissed, Telluride 
Power Transmission Co. v. Rio Grande W. Ry. Co., 187 U.S. 569 (1903). 
These cases embody over 100 years of legal precedent recognizing the 
condemnation rights of non-governmental entities. UDOT has made no effort to 
address any of the cases recognizing private condemnations, let alone provide 
some reason to believe that the Utah Legislature intended to overturn that 
precedent by failing to amend the language to reference private parties in section 
78B-6-501. Because UDOT fails to address this court's case law, this coiurt should 
not address UDOT's alternative ground. If this court does address the 
alternative ground, it should reject it based upon this court's long-standing 
precedent. 
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C. UDOT's Authorities Are Beside the Point 
Instead of addressing the abundant case law recognizing the right of 
private parties to condemn land for public use, UDOT advances three arguments 
that are beside the point. This court should reject them. 
First, UDOT cites cases to support the unremarkable position that "the 
State unquestionably has the right to take or damage private property when 
necessary for public use/7 (Resp. Br. at 8). Schroeder does not contest UDOTs 
right to condemn, although it is worth noting that section 78B-6-501 also does not 
state that governmental entities may condemn land for public purposes. The 
issue on the merits instead is whether UDOTs use is compatible with 
Schroeder's use. And under UDOT's alternative argument, the issue is whether 
the eminent domain statutes authorize Schroeder to expand an easement to 
construct a public road. UDOTs argument is beside the point. 
Second, UDOT cites a myriad of cases holding that a city cannot condemn 
land outside of its municipal boundaries without express statutory authority. 
(Resp. Br. at 8). Again, Schroeder does not challenge the validity or underlying 
principles in those cases and fails to see their relevance. Schroeder is not a city or 
municipal entity seeking to condemn land outside of its boundaries. Schroeder is 
a private party seeking to widen its current easement by a few feet so it can 
construct a public road that complies with city ordinances. 
Third, UDOT assumes that Schroeder's statutory authority must come 
from section 78B-6-501(7), which concerns residences and farms, and then argues 
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that the eminent domain statutes do not authorize Schroeder to widen its 
easement. But as demonstrated below, UDOTs assumption, like its analysis, is 
off the mark. 
D. Section 78B~6»501(3)(e) Authorizes Schroeder to Condemn Land to 
Widen an Easement to Build a Public Road 
Schroeder expressly relied on Utah Code section 78B-6-501(3)(e) when it 
filed its condemnation complaint. (R.6.). This section has not changed in 
substance since 2008 and authorizes Schroeder's condemnation action. (R.400 
(trial court order stating Schroeder "has properly alleged a public use and has 
otherwise met the statutory requirements to institute a condemnation 
proceeding.")). Strangely, UDOT chooses to ignore this section in articulating its 
alternative ground to affirm. 
Under the plain language of section 78B-6-501(3)(e), "the right of eminent 
domain may be exercised on behalf of the following public uses:. . . roads . . . for 
public vehicular use/7 Utah Code § 78B-6-501(3)(e); see also Town of Perry v. 
Thomas, 82 Utah 159,22 P.2d 343,346 (1933) ("It is well settled that the taking of 
land for public streets, highways, and roads is a public use."). The road 
Schroeder will build once its easement is widened will be subject to public 
vehicular use for accessing numerous properties, including Schroeder's property. 
Schroeder cited section 78B-6-501(3)(e) in its complaint (R.6) and the 
district court determined that Schroeder had the authority to maintain a 
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condemnation action under that section.6 (R.400.) Because the plain language of 
the applicable statute unambiguously authorizes the condemnation of land for a 
road, this court need not look beyond that language. Vigos v. Mountainland 
Builders, Inc., 2000 UT 2,113,993 P.2d 207 ("The plain language controls the 
interpretation of a statute, and only if there is ambiguity do we look beyond the 
plain language to legislative history or policy considerations/7). 
For that reason alone, this court should reject UDOTs alternative ground 
argument, which does not mention, let alone address, section 78B-6-501(3)(e). 
Instead, UDOT addresses only section 78B-6-501(7), which, as demonstrated 
next, also provides Schroeder a basis to prosecute its condemnation claims. 
E. If Section 78B~6-501(7) Applies, It Confirms That Schroeder May 
Prosecute the Condemnation Action 
UDOT assumes that the only authority for Schroeder to prosecute its 
condemnation action is section 78B-6-501(7). As demonstrated in the last section, 
that assumption is false. But even if it were true, the result would be the same 
because under the 2010 version of section 78B-6-501(7) in effect when UDOT was 
named as a defendant in this lawsuit, Schroeder had the right to condemn a road 
6
 UDOT suggests that recognizing this right will lead to chaos as "[c]ities would 
be faced with the creation of roads that they did not desire and that may, or may 
not, meet the design and construction requirement for such roadways/7 (Resp. 
Br. at 9.) UDOTs position is ironic since Schroeder needs to widen his easement 
to comply with the road width requirements of Provo City. In addition, UDOTs 
assertion is incorrect. Even though Schroeder currently has an easement, he 
cannot build a road because the easement is not wide enough, which 
demonstrates that possessing an easement is hardly sufficient to build a road. 
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to its " proposed development/' For that additional reason, this court should 
reject UDOTs alternative ground to affirm. 
Because UDOT spends much of its brief outlining the various amendments 
to section 78B-6-501(7), Schroeder will merely list them. 
• In 2009, subsection (7) authorized the right of eminent domain to 
construct "byroads leading from highways to residences and 
farms." Utah Code Ann. § 78B~6~501(7) (West 2009). 
• In 2010, the legislature amended subsection (7) to add the power 
to exercise eminent domain to construct a " byroad [] leading from 
a highway to an existing or proposed: (a) residence; (b) 
development; or (c) farm." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6~501(7) (West 
2010). 
• In 2011, the legislature removed the phrase "existing or 
proposed" from the statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(7) 
(West 2011). 
UDOT discusses the amendments to subsection (7) because it assumes that 
the 2009 version of the code applies to Schroeder's condemnation action against 
UDOT. Based upon that assumption, UDOT argues that the addition of the 
words "existing or proposed . . . development" reveals that only in 2010 did 
parties —like Schroeder—have the right to condemn land to build roads to any 
type of development. Again, UDOTs argument fails because its assumption is 
incorrect. 
To support its assumption that the 2009 version of the Utah Code governs, 
UDOT cites Carlucci v. Utah State Industrial Commission, 725 P.2d 1335,1336 
(Utah 1986), in a footnote for the proposition that "substantive rights are 
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determined by the law in place when the cause of action arose." (Resp. Br. at 9 
n.l.) While UDOT has correctly stated the law, it has not addressed the issue 
addressed in Carlucci and present here, namely when the cause of action arose. 
In Carlucci, the court held that an amended version of a statute applied because a 
wife's cause of action stemming from the death of her husband did not arise until 
his employer had become insolvent, even though the injury that ultimately 
caused his death occurred prior to the amendment. Carlucci, 725 P.2d at 1337-38. 
Here, the eminent domain claim against UDOT did not arise until 
Schroeder filed its complaint against UDOT. A condemnation action—unlike 
actions for breach of contract or personal injuries —is not based upon past events 
from which the legal claim arises and after which the claim must be filed within a 
specified limitation period. For that reason, eminent domain claims are 
governed by the version of the Utah Code operative at the time the claim is filed. 
Marion Energy, Inc. v. KFT Ranch Fship, 2011 UT 50, f 1 n. 1, 267 P.3d 863 
(applying version of the eminent domain statutes operative at the time the 
lawsuit was filed). 
What UDOT fails to appreciate is that Schroeder filed the condemnation 
claim against UDOT on September 23,2010. (R.153-59.) Therefore, the version of 
the Utah Code applicable to the claims against UDOT is the 2010 version, not the 
2009 version (and not the 2011 version).7 Under the 2010 version of section 78B-
7
 Because the 2011 amendments to section 78B-6~501(7) do not expressly declare 
themselves to be retroactive, the 2010 version applies. Utah Code § 68-3-3 (" A 
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6-501(7), the right of eminent domain may be exercised for "byroads leading 
from a highway to an existing or proposed residence; development; or farm." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-501(7) (West 2010). In its condemnation claim against 
UDOT, Schroeder seeks to widen an easement by a few feet to build a road to a 
proposed storage facility.8 (Resp. Br. at 4.) Therefore, UDOT's alternative 
ground also fails under section 78B~6-501(7). 
This court should decline to reach UDOTs alternative ground to affirm 
because it involves complex issues not adequately addressed by UDOT in the 
response brief. If this court does address the alternative ground, it should reject 
it because the applicable versions of both section 78B~6-501(3)(e) and section 78B-
6-501(7) authorize Schroeder to prosecute his condemnation claims against 
UDOT. 
II. The More Necessary Public Use Doctrine Does Not Apply Because the 
Proposed Public Uses Are Compatible 
In its response brief, UDOT acknowledges that the position UDOT 
persuaded the district court to adopt is incorrect because under the compatible 
use doctrine "two different public uses can jointly occupy a parcel of land." 
provision of the Utah Code is not retroactive, unless the provision is expressly 
declared to be retroactive."). 
8
 It also is far from obvious that Schroeder did not have authority to widen its 
easement to construct a road under the 2009 version of section 78B-6-501(7). 
Glenbrook Homeowners Assoc, v. Pettit, 919 P.2d 1061 (Nev. 1996) (private party 
had authority under identical statutory language to condemn land for 
construction of a roadway despite no express language providing that authority 
to private entities). 
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(Resp. Br. at 12) (emphasis added). UDOT instead argues that its use of the 
property as a detention basin is incompatible with Schroeder7s proposed use as a 
public road because "UDOT plans to use all of the property in question for the I-
15 CORE Project/7 and that the compatible use doctrine cannot apply when the 
existing party intends to use "full capacity of its land/7 (Id. at 13,14.) 
In other words, UDOT argues that if accommodating two uses requires a 
party to make modifications to its existing plans or use, then the two uses are 
incompatible. But for all the reasons set forth in the opening brief—and 
unaddressed in the response brief— UDOT7s position is contrary to Utah case 
law, would incentivize abuse, and runs afoul of the eminent domain statutes7 
purpose of encouraging land use that yields the greatest public benefit. (AOB at 
21-28.) 
A. An Existing Use is Incompatible With a Proposed Use Only If, By 
Reason of its Nature or Character, the Proposed Use "Supersedes 
or Destroys77 the Existing Use 
This court has held that a second use is incompatible with an existing use 
only if "by reason of its nature or character77 the second public use necessarily 
"supersedes or destroys the former use.77 Postal Tel. Cable Co., 65 P. at 739. 
Interference, inconvenience, or even permanent damage is insufficient to defeat a 
condemnation action as long as the use survives. While a condemnor must 
compensate for interference and inconvenience, they do not prevent the taking of 
land for public use. Id.; Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R. 
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Corporation, 23 Pick. 360 (Mass. 1839) (noting two uses "stand together" even if 
there is "some interference of the latter with the earlier/' because such 
inconvenience may "be compensated for by damages."); Salt Lake City v. Salt 
Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 24 Utah 249,67 P. 672,677 (1902) affd, 25 
Utah 456, 71 P. 1069 (1903) ("Under the statutes of eminent domain the law 
seems to be well settled that, where two public uses can stand together without 
material impairment or impediment of one by the other, they must so stand.").9 
This case is no different. UDOT conceded before the district court that 
"[tjhere is no question" that it is "feasible" for the land to be used for both 
projects, with little cost or delay to UDOT. (RT.687:30 (noting it "wont7 cost, it 
won't delay, we can accomplish this."). Schroeder agreed to augment any land 
UDOT needed to alter its detention pond plans by a few feet to accommodate 
Schroeder's road. Schroeder also agreed to compensate UDOT for any damages 
it suffered as a result of the alterations. (AOB at 9-10; RT.687:30,32.) Because 
UDOT admitted that Schroeder's project can be accommodated, the two uses are 
compatible. This court should reverse the district court's grant of summary 
judgment and allow Schroeder's condemnation action to move forward. 
For a list of other cases supporting this proposition, see AOB at 20 n. 9. 
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B. Material Issues of Fact As To Whether Schroeder's Road Is 
Compatible With UDOTs Detention Basin Preclude Summary 
Judgment and Requires Reversal 
UDOTs characterization of its concession in the response brief does not 
change the result. This case is before the court on a district court's grant of 
summary judgment. UDOT concedes that summary judgment is inappropriate if 
there are any issues of material fact remaining. (Resp. Br. at 2); see also Franco v. 
Church of Tesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 2001 UT 25, f 32, 21 P.3d 198. 
Yet after articulating the correct standard of review, UDOT confirms that 
summary judgment was inappropriate in its attempt to extricate itself from its 
concession that both uses could be accommodated. UDOTs explanation of its 
concession, if accepted, only demonstrates that disputed issues of material fact 
remain concerning compatible use. According to UDOT, 
Even if the parties could now agree on what property 
should be given to UDOT, it remains unclear whether 
the federal government's permits under the Clean 
Water Act would allow the use of different land. [It is 
also] unknown whether the detention basin could be 
built, in part, on a different site. 
(Resp. Br. at 14). UDOTs explanation reveals disputed issues of material fact 
concerning whether another permit would be necessary or possible. 
To understand this issue, it is worth putting UDOTs permit concerns in 
context. At the summary judgment hearing, counsel for UDOT conceded that, 
while the issue of the impact on wetlands "was not fully explored/' it appears 
from the map of where wetlands are located that wetlands would not be 
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impacted. (R.687:10.) Schroeder's counsel agreed that "the drawing that was 
submitted does not show any wetlands in that area." (Id.) Thus, UDOTs 
concern over permits is speculative, which is why it is not part of the district 
court's order. Regardless, UDOTs explanations of its concession in the response 
brief, as well as its statements at the hearing, serve only to confirm that the 
record is insufficient to conclude as a matter of law that UDOTs use is 
incompatible with Schroeder7s expanding its easement by a few feet. 
Both UDOTs concession and its characterization of its concession in the 
response brief demonstrate that the district court erred in ruling that compatible 
use doctrine is inapplicable as a matter of law. For both reasons, this court 
should vacate the entry of summary judgment. 
Conclusion 
This court should decline UDOTs invitation to address alternative ground 
concerning whether Schroeder, as a private party, can employ the eminent 
domain statutes to widen its easement to build a public road wide enough to 
comply with local ordinances. If this court does address the alternative ground, 
it should hold that Schroeder has authority to prosecute his condemnation action 
under both section 78B-6-501(3)(e) and section 78B-6-501(7). 
This court also should reject UDOTs attempt to re-characterize its 
concession that both public uses could be accommodated. At best, UDOT has 
demonstrated a disputed issue of material fact concerning whether UDOT would 
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receive a permit to alter its pond, something that must be determined before it 
can preclude the application of compatible use doctrine at this stage. 
This court should vacate the summary judgment entered in favor of UDOT 
and remand to permit the court to apply the correct legal standard in 
determining whether the uses are compatible under the compatible use doctrine. 
DATED this 15th day of August, 2012. 
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER L.L.C. 
Troy L. Booher 
Noella A. Sudbury 
Attorneys for Schroeder Investments, L.C. 
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